

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

-----117658 201055Z /12/53

P 181820Z AUG 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0425

S E C R E T GENEVA 7151

EXDIS/USSALTTWO

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR MRN /GENEVA 7151 VICE 7102/

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: COMMENTS ON MEETING, AUGUST 18, 1977

(SALT TWO - 1354)

1. AT AUGUST 18 PLENARY (SENATOR CRANSTON AND REP CARR PRESENT), I MADE NO STATEMENT HAVING PREVIOUSLY TOLD SEMENOV THAT I WOULD NOT GIVE INTENDED STATEMENT ON DATA BASE IN LIGHT OF HIS COMMENTS ON AUGUST 16 (SALTTWO - 1352).

2. SEMENOV'S FIRST STATEMENT SUPPORTD SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER. HE CRITIZED US PROPOSAL AS "CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT," LACKING REFERENCE TO NON-TRANSFER AND LACKING NECESSARY SPECIFICITY. HE NOTED THAT THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS REGARD. SEMENOV'S SECOND STATMENT CONCERNED MIRV VERIFICATION (ART II.5). NOTING PROGRESS TO DATE IN DRAFTING GROUP, HE REAFFIRMED 60-120 MRIV/NON-MIRV LAUNCHER MIX AT D&P. HE STATED THAT RS-18 (SS-19) ARE DIFFERENT FROM OTHER MISSILES AT D&P IN OUTWARD APPEARANCE, DESIGN, DIMENSION AND WEIGHT ADDING THAT, THEREFORE, STANDARIZATION OF LAUNCHERS AT D&P IS IMPOSSIBLE. HE FURTTHR ADDED THAT CONVERSION OF NON-MIRV LAUNCHERS TO MIRV LAUNCHERS

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WOULD TAKE MONTHS AND WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEAL BY NTM. HE POINTED OUT THAT ANTENNAS AT 60 LAUNCHERS AT D&P ARE ONE OF THE DISTRINGUISHING EXTERNAL FEATURES OF THE RS-18 (SS-19) LAUNCHERS.

3. IN BILATERAL, WE EACH REPEATED POSITIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER. SEMENOV INDICATED SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT

TO AGREEMENT LANGUAGE BUT CONTINUED TO INSIST ON PROVISIONS DEALING WITH BOTH SUBJECTS.

4. ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES (XVI.3), I DREW UPON RECENT INSTRUCTIONS (REFTEL STATE 195070/188466) REJECTING SOVIET PROPOSAL TO EXEMPT TELEMTRY DESCRIBING THE ISSUE AS ONE OF POLICY, NOT A TECHNICAL MATTER. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE TO US OF ANY EXEMPTION AND STATED US REQUIREMENT FOR PROVISION THAT NEITHER SIDE IMPLEMENT MEASURES OR PRACTICES WHICH DELIBERATELY CONCEAL DATA DURING FLIGHT-TESTING OF RELEVANT SYSTEMS.

5. KLOSSON-MCNEILL/KARPOV-SMOLIN BILERAL. KARPOV, IN DISCUSSING AGREED STATEMENT TO XVI.3 OFFERED TO DROP SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR "SPECAIL MEASURES" AND REFERENCE TO TESTING IF US DROPPED ITS REFERENCE TO TESTING. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE TELEMTRY ISSUE, LIKE PENALTY TESTING, BE ADDRESSED IN A SEPARATE AGREED STATEMENT. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO ARTICLE II.5 AND US PROPOSAL WHICH CORRELATES US AND SOVIET DESIGNATION OF MISSILES. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT US DETAILED APPROACH.

6. SENATOR CRANSTON-CAPT BUTTS/BELETISKY-PAVLITCHENKO BILATERAL. SENATOR CRANSTON STRESSED THAT WE CANNOT HAVE AN AGREEMENT BASED SIMPLY ON BLIND TRUST AND FAITH, BUT WE NEED TO HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ADEQUATELY VERIFY COMPLAINTS IN ORDER NOT ONLY
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TO PROVIDE SECURITY BUT ALSO TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR TREATY RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE. FURTHER, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION ALONE DO NOT GUARANTEE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE INTERPRETATION OF DATA. TO THAT END, SPECIFICITY OF PROVISIONS AND AN AGREED DATA BASE MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TREATY. ONLY THEN CAN WE BE SURE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE THE SAME INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND AVOID FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION, BUTTS NOTED THAT DETAIL WAS NOT NECESSARY TO MAKE THE PROVISION CLEAR AND, IN FACT, THE US PROVISION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION WAS VERY CLEAR.

7. CONGRESSMAN CARR-DR. JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL. CONCERNING THE ANTENNAS FOR RS-18 MISSILE LAUNCHERS AT D&P, SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT THE ANTENNA IS NOT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MIRV LAUNCHER SYSTEM BUT CAN BE USED AS A GEOGRAPHICAL LANDMARK TO INDICATE LOCATION OF MIRV LAUNCHERS. SHCHUKIN, NOTING A PRESS ARTICLE WHICH STATED THAT THE US WAS PLANNING TO TEST AN MX LAUNCHER WITH A DUMMY MISSILE AND THAT THE DUMMY MISSILE WOULD BE USED TO PUNCH A HOLE INTO THE CONCRETE ROOF OF A TRENCH. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT, IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THIS WOULD BE "TESTING" AS WOULD ROAD-TESTING AS HE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED.

8. FREW-KWIECIAK/BEKETOV-KOUKLEV BILATERAL. FREW INDICATED THAT SEMENOV'S STATEMENT DHELPS US UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIET'S VIEW D&P BUT DOES NOT RESOLVE GENERAL MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE PROPOSED BY US. FREW EMPHASIZED THAT THE US IS NOT ONLY CONCERNED WITH D&P BUT FUTURE CASES AS WELL AND THAT D&P WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A TYPE OF SITUATION THAT THE US WANTED TO PRECLUDE IN THE FUTURE. BEKETOV THEN BROUGHT UP THE POINT THAT THE NECESSARY ASSOCIATION OF A MIRV SLBM WITH A LAUNCHER COULD NOT BE DONE AT A TEST RANGE.EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GENEVA07151
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770301-0689
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770850/aaaabpth.tel
Line Count: 125
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: b4a51759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1568398
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: COMMENTS ON MEETING, AUGUST 18, 1977 (SALT TWO - 1354)
TAGS: PARM, PDIP, US, UR, USSALTTWO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/b4a51759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009